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INTRODUCTION

The criminal law—a beautiful, albeit sometimes ramshackle,
institution devoted to blaming and punishing culpable agents—has been
* J.D., Ph.D. Ferdinand Wakeman Hubbell Professor of Law, Professor of Psychology
and Law in Psychiatry, and Associate Director, Center for Neuroscience & Society, University
of Pennsylvania. This Article is based on the author’s Barrock Lecture in Criminal Law
delivered at Marquette Law School in November 2014. I thank Dean Joseph Kearney,
Professors Janine Kim, Matthew Parlow, Daniel Blinka, and Michael McChrystal, and all their
colleagues for making my visit to Marquette so stimulating and pleasant.
This Article distills, draws on, and extends the work I have been doing on law and
neuroscience for two decades. Many of the arguments are familiar, but until there are
conceptual or scientific breakthroughs—and none is on the horizon—this is my story and I’m
sticking to it.
I am indebted to the readers and critics, who are too numerous to mention, who have
helped me refine my positions. Michael Moore deserves special mention, however, for no one
has taught me as much. I also thank Ed Greenlee, as always, for his superb, invaluable help.
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developing for well over half a millennium to help us live together. It is
the product of an immense number of judicial decisions and penal
statutes, and it has stood the test of time as the product of human trial
and error. We common lawyers like to think that it is impossible to
produce an ex ante watertight criminal code. As is well known, the Model
Penal Code, an enterprise produced by the best and the brightest, has
been subjected to intense criticism, and even states that have been heavily
influenced by it have made substantial changes. Instead, common lawyers
believe that the bottom-up, “organic” methodology of the common-law
process in interaction with penal codes will ultimately produce reasonably
coherent and just, but not perfect, criminal law.
The criminal law is a thoroughly folk-psychological enterprise.1
Doctrine and practice implicitly assume that human beings are agents,
creatures who act intentionally for reasons, who can be guided by reasons,
and who in adulthood are capable of sufficient rationality to ground full
responsibility unless an excusing condition obtains. We all take this
“standard picture” for granted because it is the foundation not just of law
but of interpersonal relations generally, including how we explain
ourselves to others and to ourselves.
The law’s concept of the person and responsibility has been under
assault throughout the modern scientific era, but in the last few decades
dazzling technological innovations and discoveries in some sciences,
especially the new neuroscience and to a lesser extent genetics, have put
unprecedented pressure on the standard picture. For example, in a 2002
editorial published in The Economist, the following warning was given:
“Genetics may yet threaten privacy, kill autonomy, make society
homogeneous and gut the concept of human nature. But neuroscience
could do all of these things first.”2 Consider the following statement from
a widely noticed chapter by neuroscientists Joshua Greene of Harvard
and Jonathan Cohen of Princeton, which I quote at length to give the full
flavor of the claim being made:
[A]s more and more scientific facts come in, providing
increasingly vivid illustrations of what the human mind is really
like, more and more people will develop moral intuitions that are
at odds with our current social practices . . . .
Neuroscience has a special role to play in this process for the
following reason. As long as the mind remains a black box, there
1. I discuss the meaning of folk psychology more thoroughly in Part IV.
2. The Ethics of Brain Science: Open Your Mind, ECONOMIST, May 25, 2002, at 77, 77,
www.economist.com/node/1143317/print [http://perma.cc/3DKJ-9GAZ].
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will always be a donkey on which to pin dualist and libertarian
intuitions. . . . What neuroscience does, and will continue to do at
an accelerated pace, is elucidate the “when”, “where” and “how”
of the mechanical processes that cause behaviour. It is one thing
to deny that human decision-making is purely mechanical when
your opponent offers only a general, philosophical argument. It is
quite another to hold your ground when your opponent can make
detailed predictions about how these mechanical processes work,
complete with images of the brain structures involved and
equations that describe their function.
....
At some further point . . . , [p]eople may grow up completely
used to the idea that every decision is a thoroughly mechanical
process, the outcome of which is completely determined by the
results of prior mechanical processes. What will such people think
as they sit in their jury boxes? . . . Will jurors of the future wonder
whether the defendant . . . could have done otherwise? Whether
he really deserves to be punished . . . ? We submit that these
questions, which seem so important today, will lose their grip in
an age when the mechanical nature of human decision-making is
fully appreciated. The law will continue to punish misdeeds, as it
must for practical reasons, but the idea of distinguishing the truly,
deeply guilty from those who are merely victims of neuronal
circumstances will, we submit, seem pointless.3
This is not the familiar metaphysical claim that determinism is
incompatible with responsibility, about which I will say more below.4 It
is a far more radical claim that denies the conception of personhood and
action that underlies not only criminal responsibility but the coherence of
law as a normative institution. It thus completely conflicts with our
common sense. As the eminent philosopher of mind and action, Jerry
Fodor, has written:
[W]e have . . . no decisive reason to doubt that very many
commonsense belief/desire explanations are—literally—true.
Which is just as well, because if commonsense intentional
psychology really were to collapse, that would be, beyond
3. Joshua Greene & Jonathan Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and
Everything, in LAW AND THE BRAIN 207, 217–18 (Semir Zeki & Oliver Goodenough eds.,
2006).
4. See ROBERT KANE, A CONTEMPORARY INTRODUCTION TO FREE WILL 23-31 (2005)
(explaining incompatibilism). I return to the subject in Parts III and V below. For now, it is
sufficient to note that there are good answers to this challenge.
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comparison, the greatest intellectual catastrophe in the history of
our species; if we’re that wrong about the mind, then that’s the
wrongest we’ve ever been about anything. The collapse of the
supernatural, for example, didn’t compare; theism never came
close to being as intimately involved in our thought and our
practice . . . as belief/desire explanation is. Nothing except,
perhaps, our commonsense physics—our intuitive commitment to
a world of observer-independent, middle-sized objects—comes as
near our cognitive core as intentional explanation does. We’ll be
in deep, deep trouble if we have to give it up.
I’m dubious . . . that we can give it up; that our intellects are so
constituted that doing without it ( . . . really doing without it; not
just loose philosophical talk) is a biologically viable option. But
be of good cheer; everything is going to be all right.5
The central thesis of this Article is that Fodor is correct and that our
commonsense understanding of agency and responsibility and the
legitimacy of criminal justice generally are not imperiled by
contemporary discoveries in the various sciences, including neuroscience
and genetics. These sciences will not revolutionize criminal law, at least
not anytime soon, and at most they may make modest contributions to
legal doctrine, practice, and policy.
I first address the criminal law’s motivation and the motivation of
some advocates to turn to science to solve the very hard normative
problems that law addresses. The next part discusses how I think the law
should respond to the metaphysical issues that underpin our concepts of
action and responsibility. Then the Article considers the law’s psychology
and its concepts of the person and responsibility. Next, I describe the
general relation of neuroscience to law, which I characterize as the issue
of “translation.” The following part canvasses various distractions,
especially determinism and the notion that causation is per se an excusing
condition, that have bedeviled clear thinking about the relation of
scientific, causal accounts of behavior to responsibility. Next, I examine
the limits of neurolaw and then consider why neuroscience does not pose
a genuinely radical challenge to the law’s concepts of the person and
responsibility. The penultimate part makes a case for cautious optimism
about the contribution that neuroscience may make to criminal law in the
near and intermediate term. A brief conclusion follows. Throughout,
common sense is my guiding star.
5. JERRY A. FODOR, PSYCHOSEMANTICS: THE PROBLEM OF MEANING IN THE
PHILOSOPHY OF MIND xii (1987).
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II. NEUROEXUBERANCE
Advances in neuroimaging since the early 1990s have been the source
of the exuberance. Two in particular stand out: the discovery of
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), which allows noninvasive
measurement of neural functioning, and the availability of ever-higherresolution scanners, known colloquially as “magnets” because they use
powerful magnetic fields to collect the data that are ultimately expressed
in the colorful brain images that appear in the scientific and popular
media. Bedazzled by the technology and the many impressive findings,
however, too many legal scholars and advocates have made claims for the
relevance of the new neuroscience to law that are unsupported by the
data6 or that are conceptually confused.7 I have termed this tendency
“brain overclaim syndrome (BOS)” and have recommended “cognitive
jurotherapy (CJ)” as the appropriate therapy.8
Everyone understands that legal issues are normative, addressing how
we should regulate our lives in a complex society. How do we live
together? What are the duties we owe each other? For violations of those
duties, when is the state justified in imposing the most afflictive—but
sometimes justified—exercises of state power, criminal blame, and
punishment?9 When should we do this, to whom, and how much?
Virtually every legal issue is contested—consider criminal
responsibility, for example—and there is always room for debate about
policy, doctrine, and adjudication. In a recent book, Professor Robin
Feldman has argued that law lacks the courage forthrightly to address the
difficult normative issues that it faces.10 The law therefore adopts what
Feldman terms an “internalizing” and an “externalizing” strategy for
using science to try to avoid the difficulties.11 In the internalizing strategy,
the law adopts scientific criteria as legal criteria. A futuristic example
6. Stephen J. Morse, Lost in Translation? An Essay on Law and Neuroscience, in 13 LAW
529 (Michael Freeman ed., 2010).
7. See, e.g., MICHAEL S. PARDO & DENNIS PATTERSON, MINDS, BRAINS, AND LAW:
THE CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE (2013); Michael S. Moore,
Libet’s Challenge(s) to Responsible Agency, in CONSCIOUS WILL AND RESPONSIBILITY 207
(Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Lynn Nadel eds., 2011).
8. Stephen J. Morse, Brain Overclaim Redux, 31 LAW & INEQ. 509 (2013); Stephen J.
Morse, Brain Overclaim Syndrome and Criminal Responsibility: A Diagnostic Note, 3 OHIO ST.
J. CRIM. L. 397 (2006).
9. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (holding that due process requires that
every conviction be supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt as to every element of the
crime).
10. ROBIN FELDMAN, THE ROLE OF SCIENCE IN LAW (2009).
11. Id. at 19–21, 37–39.
AND NEUROSCIENCE
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might be using neural criteria for criminal responsibility. In the
externalizing strategy, the law turns to scientific or clinical experts to
make the decision. An example would be using forensic clinicians to
decide whether a criminal defendant is competent to stand trial and then
simply rubberstamping the clinician’s opinion. Neither strategy is
successful because each avoids facing the hard questions and impedes
legal evolution and progress. Professor Feldman concludes, and I agree,
that the law does not err by using science too little, as is commonly
claimed. Rather, it errs by using it too much, because the law is insecure
about its resources and capacities to do justice.12
A fascinating question is why so many enthusiasts seem to have
extravagant expectations about the contribution of neuroscience to law,
especially criminal law. Here is my speculation about the source. Many
people intensely dislike the concept and practice of retributive justice,
thinking that they are prescientific and harsh. Their hope is that the new
neuroscience will convince the law at last that determinism is true, no
offender is genuinely responsible, and the only logical conclusion is that
the law should adopt a consequentially based prediction/prevention
system of social control guided by the knowledge of the neuroscientistkings who will finally have supplanted the platonic philosopher-kings.13
Then, they believe, criminal justice will be kinder, fairer, and more
rational. They do not recognize, however, that most of the draconian
innovations in criminal law that have led to so much incarceration—such
as recidivist enhancements, mandatory minimum sentences, and the
crack/powder cocaine sentencing disparities—were all driven by
consequential concerns for deterrence and incapacitation. Moreover, as
C.S. Lewis recognized long ago, such a scheme is disrespectful and
dehumanizing.14
Finally, there is nothing inherently harsh about
retributivism. It is a theory of justice that may be applied toughly or
tenderly.
On a more modest level, many advocates think that neuroscience may
not revolutionize criminal justice, but neuroscience will demonstrate that
many more offenders should be excused and do not deserve the harsh
punishments imposed by the United States criminal justice system. Four
decades ago, our criminal justice system would have been using
psychodynamic psychology for the same purpose. More recently,

12. Id. at 199–200.
13. Greene & Cohen, supra note 3, are exemplars of this type of thinking. I will discuss
the normative inertness of this position in Part VIII.
14. C.S. Lewis, The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment, 6 RES JUDICATAE 224 (1953).
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genetics has been employed in a similar manner. The impulse, however,
is clear: jettison desert, or at least mitigate, judgments of desert. As will
be shown below, however, these advocates often adopt an untenable
theory of mitigation or an excuse that quickly collapses into the nihilistic
conclusion that no one is really criminally responsible.
III. PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS AND SPOCKIAN METHODOLOGY
One is always “doing” metaphysics whether or not one is aware of it.
About some legal issues, it scarcely matters, but about the types of issues
that the new sciences address, such as the causation of action (the mindbody problem) and the criteria for responsibility (compatibilism vs.
incompatibilism), metaphysical assumptions matter. The question is
whether one must resolve or even defend one’s metaphysical and other
philosophical foundations in these fraught areas. I think not. I make no
claim for metaphysical or philosophical quietism because I believe that
metaphysical questions are conceptually and practically important in
many cases.15 I shall suggest, however, that, when philosophy is
foundational and practically important, one’s position must be
acknowledged but need not be defended or, a fortiori, resolved.
Please do the following thought experiment. Imagine that you do a
content analysis of high-level introductory texts in metaphysics or in any
other area in philosophy, such as the philosophy of mind and action. The
intrepid investigator will find, without exception, that each text will
describe many different, often contradictory, approaches to the central
questions. What is the relation of the potential truth of determinism to
the possibility of “free will” and responsibility? Every text will discuss
libertarianism, hard determinism, and compatibilism. Are there moral
truths independent of our constructs and practices? Every text will
discuss varieties of realism, antirealism, and everything in between. What
is the relation of the brain to consciousness, mind, and action? Every text
will present various forms of physicalism and the like. There will almost
always be good arguments for and against the various positions, but none
will have clearly dominated, although some, such as substance dualism,
will be included largely for historical reasons. Moreover, it is a science
fiction fantasy to believe that science will resolve the most fundamental
problems that might in principle admit of empirical solutions, at least in
the lifetimes of the readers of this Article. Consequently, all the
contenders will be left standing. To paraphrase the noted metaphysician,
15. See generally Charles L. Barzun, Metaphysical Quietism and Functional Explanation
in the Law, 34 LAW & PHIL. 89 (2015) (arguing for metaphysical engagement).
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Lewis Carroll, everyone has won (at least in his or her own eyes) and all
must have prizes.
What is a poor, country lawyer-scholar supposed to do in such
circumstances when trying to make normative arguments about doctrine,
practice, and policy? One possibility is to master all the metaphysical
arguments relevant to the question being addressed, take a position, and
try to defend it against the counterarguments. This seems like a bootless
enterprise, however, if one’s training is not in metaphysics and if one is
primarily interested in doctrine, practice, and policy.
Arguing
metaphysics, or other basic philosophical issues, is not the country lawyerscholar’s comparative advantage, and it will not lead to an
uncontroversial position, even if one were to achieve sufficient mastery.
Further, the history of the law suggests that country lawyers can “run the
railroad” without even recognizing the foundational issues that are
implicated. If philosophical understanding is not the goal, it is in large
measure a distraction. So the original question remains: How should one
proceed?
My current preferred approach is what I call “Spockian solutions,” or
what to do until the doctors of metaphysics and science arrive to cure our
metaphysical and empirical ills. By Spockian I do not mean the coldbloodedly, rational Vulcan, Dr. Spock, of Star Trek fame. I refer to the
even more famous pediatrician and author, Dr. Benjamin M. Spock
(1903–1998), whose many editions of the influential child care manual,
Baby and Child Care, guided parents over the shoals of child-rearing for
many generations.16 At a time when it was more difficult to obtain
medical attention for one’s sick child, the book was replete with formulas
for ameliorating the problem—be it fever, diarrhea, or any other of the
common ills that beset children17—until the doctor came (doctors made
house calls in the past) or until the parents and child could make it to the
doctor.
In the spirit of Dr. Spock, my legal home remedy is to start with a
normative position that is attractive at the non-metaphysical level of
applied ethical, moral, political, and legal theory. If this position is
consistent with a reasonable metaphysics that does not conflict with
relatively uncontroversial, or at least plausible, empirical accounts about
the world and with other reasonable philosophical theories, then one can
16. BENJAMIN SPOCK, BABY AND CHILD CARE (4th ed. 1976). I cite an earlier edition
because the following examples are drawn from it. The book is now in its ninth edition (with
Robert Needlman).
17. Id. at 235-37 (diarrhea), 501-02 (high fever).
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proceed without defending the metaphysics, the empirics, and the other
philosophical positions. Common sense should enter the analysis, too.
Any position that violates common sense should meet the most
demanding burden of persuasion. Once one’s foundational position is
adopted, however, the scholar does have the duty to avoid adopting
normative positions that require inconsistent metaphysical or other
foundational positions unless there is good reason why different
metaphysics or foundations may be appropriate for different contexts.
This home remedy is intellectually defensible. A plausible basic
position must be taken, which requires reasonable understanding. A
critic might point out all the reasons that the chosen metaphysics or other
philosophical foundation is questionable and, therefore, that the
normative position adopted might seem unjustified. But a sophisticated
metaphysician who adheres to the chosen metaphysics would have
answers, and there would be no decisive arguments to refute the
sophisticate. Trying to defend a metaphysics at the level of professional
philosophy involves too much “inside baseball” analysis when one is
trying to accomplish something else.
Now let me turn to examples of the home remedy that are relevant to
the other topics this Article addresses. The basic questions that run
through most are the relation of the brain (or body, or matter) to mind
and action and the implications of the truth of determinism. I am a
physicalist about the former. The brain enables the mind and action, but
we have no idea how, despite all the astonishing advances in neuroscience
and other disciplines.18 Indeed, the problem of consciousness may be
insoluble,19 although perhaps progress can be made on mental states and
actions. How do we know that the brain enables the mind and action?
Well, if your brain is dead, you are dead, and to the best of our knowledge,
you have no mental states and aren’t doing much at all (although your
heart and lungs may still be working if your brain stem is still alive).
Assuming that the brain does enable the mind and action, is the
relation reductive or not? Is property dualism true? Can mental states
cause changes in physical states, or does the exclusion principle require
that causation can only run from the physical to the mental? At present,

18. PAUL R. MCHUGH & PHILLIP R. SLAVNEY, THE PERSPECTIVES OF PSYCHIATRY
11–12 (2d ed. 1998); Ralph Adolphs, The Unsolved Problems of Neuroscience, 19 TRENDS
COGNITIVE SCI. 173,175 (2015).
19. See, e.g., COLIN MCGINN, THE MYSTERIOUS FLAME: CONSCIOUS MINDS IN A
MATERIAL WORLD (1999).
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nonreductive physicalism is probably the dominant view, but neither I nor
anyone else can decisively answer the foregoing and similar questions.
I subscribe to the causal theory of action (CTA), of which there are
many forms and many criticisms.20 CTA roughly holds that an event
(behavioral or mental) is an action if it is caused in the right way by mental
states. I am happy to adopt any version of CTA that accords with
common sense and the folk-psychological theory that we always use to
explain ourselves to ourselves and to others.21 Moreover, there is a
plausible philosophical argument that causation can run from the mental
to the physical despite the exclusion principle.22 I am not suggesting
anything mysterious or any form of sui generis agent-causation. In
principle, how action happens will be explicable according to whatever
scientific laws governing the rest of the universe might be discovered. The
task of neuroscience should be to explain agency, not to explain it away
reductively.
So there is good foundational reason to adopt the CTA and to
continue to hold that we are agents who can act for, and be guided by,
reasons and whose most habitual or thoughtless behavior can be brought
under the control of reason if the person has reason to do so.
On the foundational question of whether mental states can be reduced
to brain or other physical states, I am most attracted to nonreductive
physicalism. We have a mind/brain, which is only one substance, but it
has both physical and mental properties. The latter are emergent and
cannot be reduced fully to the former. This appears the most
commonsensical view, and there is no scientific reason to doubt it at
present. The greatest experts cannot resolve this issue; no more can a
poor, country lawyer-scholar. Luckily I do not have to. It is sufficient
that there are plausible, philosophical accounts that are consistent with
CTA and folk-psychological explanations. I am perfectly content
opportunistically to adopt any of them.
I am thoroughly a compatibilist on the metaphysical question of
20. Jesús H. Aguilar & Andrei A. Buckareff, The Causal Theory of Action: Origins and
Issues, in CAUSING HUMAN ACTIONS 1 (Jesús H. Aguilar & Andrei A. Buckareff eds., 2010)
(providing a useful overview). The volume contains many excellent chapters addressing the
issues in more detail.
21. In this respect, I am particularly attracted to Michael Moore’s recently revised
account. Michael S. Moore, Renewed Questions About the Causal Theory of Action, in
CAUSING HUMAN ACTIONS, supra note 20, at 27. See generally JOHN HYMAN, ACTION,
KNOWLEDGE, AND WILL (2015) (providing a fascinating account of the current state of the
philosophy of action and a surely controversial theory of its own).
22. Christian List & Peter Menzies, Nonreductive Physicalism and the Limits of the
Exclusion Principle, 106 J. PHIL. 475 (2009).
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whether genuine responsibility is possible in a deterministic (or
something quite like that) universe. This is the generic view, expressed
in many forms by different theorists,23 that although no one has
libertarian free will—the ability to act uncaused by anything but oneself—
genuine responsibility is possible even in a determinist universe. Agents
must simply have the capacity to determine their actions by reasons and
to act in light of those reasons and are not compelled to act in the ordinary
meaning of compulsion (say, a gun to the head). The God-like power of
libertarian or contra-causal freedom is not necessary for responsibility on
this earth. As is argued below, nothing in current neuroscience suggests
that people do not have these capacities,24 and it is clear that most people
most of the time are not compelled in the ordinary sense when they act.
Compatibilism is almost certainly the dominant view among
professional philosophers,25 but it is of course controversial and a
metaphysical question that science cannot resolve. Many people
probably intuitively believe that we have libertarian free will, and
certainly that belief is consistent with criminal law doctrine. This position
is extremely implausible in the modern scientific age, however. Human
beings, as complex as they are, are still part of the physical universe and
subject to the same laws that govern all phenomena. I will return to the
consistency of determinism with doctrines of criminal responsibility
below,26 but for now it is sufficient to note that compatibilism is also
consistent with all criminal law doctrines and mostly accords with
common sense in the modern scientific era. It is a perfectly good home
remedy.
I take no position on the vexed question of whether anyone can do
otherwise even if the CTA is true. There is dispute about how the
principle of alternative possibilities should be interpreted, and, like Jay

23. See, e.g., John Martin Fischer, Frankfurt-Type Examples and Semicompatibilism: New
Work, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FREE WILL 243 (Robert Kane ed., 2d ed. 2011);
Michael McKenna, Contemporary Compatibilism: Mesh Theories and Reasons-Responsive
Theories, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FREE WILL, supra, at 175; Paul Russell, Moral Sense
and the Foundations of Responsibility, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FREE WILL, supra, at
199; Christopher Taylor & Daniel Dennett, Who’s Still Afraid of Determinism? Rethinking
Causes and Possibilities, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FREE WILL, supra, at 221.
24. See infra Part VIII.
25. David Bourget & David J. Chalmers, What Do Philosophers Believe?, 170 PHIL.
STUD. 465, 476 (2014) (reporting the results of a 2009 survey of professional philosophers that
showed that a majority are either compatibilists or tend towards compatibilism); The
PhilPapers Surveys: Preliminary Survey Results, PHILPAPERS, http://philpapers.org/surveys/re
sults.pl [http://perma.cc/DS94-5RUW] (last visited Oct. 19, 2015).
26. See infra Part V.
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Wallace,27 I very much doubt that foundational questions of responsibility
will be decided by precious deployment of modal logic. There are
sufficient, extant arguments to suggest that the principle of alternative
possibilities is not a problem.28 They are controversial, but this question
will not be solved to everyone’s satisfaction, and we have a railroad to
run. I am a compatibilist, a perfectly plausible metaphysics, and will
continue to believe that robust responsibility is possible until an
incontrovertible argument that all would accept requires me to jettison
this view.
In short, CTA and compatibilism are my bedrock metaphysics. If
anyone else wishes to claim that I need a particular type of CTA theory
or compatibilism, I am happy to take that as a friendly amendment.
Giving up CTA or compatibilism would undermine my work in general
and the arguments of this Article in particular, but happily, nothing in
philosophy or science suggests that I must do so for now.
IV. THE LAW’S PSYCHOLOGY, CONCEPT OF THE PERSON, AND
RESPONSIBILITY
Criminal law presupposes a “folk psychological” view of the person and
behavior.29 This psychological theory causally explains behavior in part by
mental states such as desires, beliefs, intentions, willings, and plans.30
Biological and other psychological and sociological variables also play a
causal role, and a complete explanation would involve variables from all
levels of all these fields.31 But folk psychology considers mental states
fundamental to a full causal explanation and understanding of human
action. Lawyers, philosophers, and scientists argue about the definitions
of mental states and theories of action, but that does not undermine the
general claim that mental states are fundamental. The arguments and

27. R. JAY WALLACE, RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MORAL SENTIMENTS 202, 251–65
(1994).
28. See, e.g., KADRI VIHVELIN, CAUSES, LAWS, AND FREE WILL: WHY DETERMINISM
DOESN’T MATTER (2013).
29. Katrina L. Sifferd, In Defense of the Use of Commonsense Psychology in the Criminal
Law, 25 LAW & PHIL. 571, 571 (2006).
30. This meaning of folk psychology as a casual explanatory theory of action must be
distinguished from the usage of the term to refer to bits of folk wisdom about the content of
those mental states. For example, folk wisdom is that adolescents are more impulsive than
adults. Any of the latter might be disconfirmed by empirical evidence, but the former can be
disconfirmed only if the radical critique is demonstrated to be true. See infra Part VIII for a
discussion of this possibility.
31. This is known as a multifield, multilevel mode of explanation. See CARL F. CRAVER,
EXPLAINING THE BRAIN: MECHANISMS AND THE MOSAIC UNITY OF NEUROSCIENCE (2007).
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evidence that disputants use to convince others presuppose the folkpsychological view of the person. Brains do not convince each other,
people do. Folk psychology presupposes only that human action will at
least be rationalizable by mental state explanations or will be responsive
to reasons—including incentives—under the right conditions.
For example, the folk-psychological explanation for why you are
reading this Article is roughly that you desire to understand the relation
of neuroscience to criminal responsibility; you believe that reading the
Article will help fulfill that desire. As a result of your desire and belief, you
formed the intention to read it. This is a practical, rather than a deductive,
syllogism.
Brief reflection should indicate that the law’s psychology must be a
folk-psychological theory, a view of the person as a conscious—and
potentially self-conscious—creature who forms and acts on intentions that
are the product of the person’s other mental states. We are the sort of
creatures who can act for, and respond to, reasons. The law treats persons
generally as intentional creatures and not simply as mechanistic forces of
nature.
Law is primarily action-guiding and is not able to guide people directly
and indirectly unless people are capable of using rules as premises in their
reasoning about how they should behave. Unless people could be guided
by law, it would be useless (and perhaps incoherent) as an action-guiding
system of rules.32 Legal rules are action-guiding primarily because these
rules provide an agent with good moral or prudential reasons for
forbearance or action. Human behavior can be modified by means other
than influencing deliberation, and human beings do not always deliberate
before they act. Nonetheless, the law presupposes folk psychology, even
32. See GEORGE SHER, IN PRAISE OF BLAME 123 (2006) (stating that although
philosophers disagree about the requirements and justifications of what morality requires,
there is widespread agreement that “the primary task of morality is to guide action”); Scott J.
Shapiro, Law, Morality, and the Guidance of Conduct, 6 LEGAL THEORY 127, 131–32 (2000);
John R. Searle, End of the Revolution, 49 N.Y. REV. BOOKS, at 33, 35 (2002).
This view assumes that law is sufficiently knowable to guide conduct, but a contrary
assumption is largely incoherent. As Shapiro writes:
Legal skepticism is an absurd doctrine. It is absurd because the law cannot be
the sort of thing that is unknowable. If a system of norms were unknowable, then that
system would not be a legal system. One important reason why the law must be
knowable is that its function is to guide conduct.
Shapiro, supra, at 131. I do not assume that legal rules are always clear and thus capable of
precise action guidance. If most rules in a legal system were not sufficiently clear most of the
time, however, the system could not function. Further, the principle of legality dictates that
criminal law rules should be especially clear.
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when we most habitually follow the legal rules. Unless people are capable
of understanding and then using legal rules to guide their conduct, the law
is powerless to affect human behavior.
The legal view of the person does not hold that people must always
reason or consistently behave rationally according to some preordained,
normative notion of rationality. Rather, the law’s view is that people are
capable of minimal rationality according to predominantly conventional,
socially constructed standards. The type of rationality the law requires is
the ordinary person’s commonsense view of rationality, not the technical
notion that might be acceptable within the disciplines of economics,
philosophy, psychology, computer science, and the like. Rationality is a
congeries of abilities, including inter alia getting the facts straight, having a
relatively coherent preference-ordering, understanding what variables are
relevant to action, and the ability to understand how to achieve the goals
one has (instrumental rationality). How these abilities should be
interpreted and how much of them are necessary for responsibility may be
debated, but the debate is about rationality.
Virtually everything for which agents deserve to be praised, blamed,
rewarded, or punished is the product of mental causation and, in principle,
is responsive to reasons, including incentives. Machines may cause harm,
but they cannot do wrong, and they cannot violate expectations about how
people ought to live together. Machines do not deserve praise, blame,
reward, punishment, concern, or respect because they exist or as a
consequence of the results they cause. Only people, intentional agents with
the potential to act, can do wrong and violate expectations of what they
owe each other.
Many scientists and some philosophers of mind and action might
consider folk psychology to be a primitive or prescientific view of human
behavior. For the foreseeable future, however, the law will be based on the
folk-psychological model of the person and behavior described. Until and
unless scientific discoveries convince us that our view of ourselves is
radically wrong, the basic explanatory apparatus of folk psychology will
remain central. It is vital that we not lose sight of this model lest we fall
into confusion when various claims based on neuroscience or other sciences
are made. If any science is to have appropriate influence on current
criminal law and legal decision making, the science must be relevant to and
translated into the law’s folk-psychological framework.
All of the criminal law’s doctrinal criteria for criminal responsibility are
folk psychological. Begin with the definitional criteria, the “elements” of
crime. The “voluntary” act requirement is defined, roughly, as an intentional
bodily movement—or omission in cases in which the person has a duty to

2015]

CRIMINAL LAW AND COMMON SENSE

53

act—done in a reasonably integrated state of consciousness. Other than
crimes of strict liability, all crimes also require a culpable mental state, such
as purpose, knowledge, or recklessness. All affirmative defenses of
justification and excuse involve an inquiry into the person’s mental state,
such as the belief that self-defensive force was necessary or the lack of
knowledge of right from wrong.
Our folk-psychological concepts of criminal responsibility follow
logically from the action-guiding nature of law itself, from its folkpsychological concept of the person and action, and from the aims of
achieving retributive justice, which holds that no one should be punished
unless he deserves it and no more than he deserves, and the maximization
of social safety. The general capacity for rationality is the primary condition
for responsibility, and the lack of that capacity is the primary condition for
excusing a person. If human beings were not rational creatures who could
understand the good reasons for action and were not capable of
conforming to legal requirements through intentional action or
forbearance, the law could not adequately guide action and would not be
just. Legally responsible agents are therefore people who have the general
capacity to grasp and be guided by good reason in particular legal
contexts.33
In cases of excuse, the agent who has done something wrong acts for a
reason but is either incapable of rationality generally or incapable on the
specific occasion in question. This explains, for example, why young
children and some people with mental disorders are not held responsible.
The amount of lack of capacity for rationality that is necessary to find the
agent not responsible is a moral, social, political, and, ultimately, a legal
issue. It is not a scientific, medical, psychological, or psychiatric issue.
Compulsion or coercion is also an excusing condition. Literal
compulsion exists when the person’s bodily movement is a pure mechanism
that is not rationalizable by reference to the agent’s mental states. These
cases defeat the requirement of a “voluntary act.” For example, a tremor
or spasm produced by a neurological disorder is not an action because it is
not intentional and, therefore, defeats the ascription of a voluntary act.
Metaphorical compulsion exists when an agent acts intentionally but in
response to some hard choice imposed on the agent through no fault of his
or her own. For example, if a miscreant holds a gun to an agent’s head and
threatens to kill her unless she kills another innocent person, it would be
wrong to kill under these circumstances. Nevertheless, the law may decide
33. I adapt the felicitous phrase “to grasp and be guided by good reason” from
WALLACE, supra note 27, at 86.
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as a normative matter to excuse the act of intentional killing because the
agent was motivated by a threat so great that it would be supremely difficult
for most citizens to resist.34
Cases involving internal compulsive states are more difficult to
conceptualize because it is difficult to define and assess “loss of control.”35
The cases that most fit this category are “disorders of desire,” such as
addictions and sexual disorders. The question is why these acting agents
lack control but other people with strong desires do not. If people
frequently yield to their apparently very strong desires at great social,
medical, occupational, financial, and legal cost to themselves, agents will
often say they could not help themselves, they were not in control, and an
excuse or mitigation is therefore warranted. But why mitigation or excuse
should obtain is difficult to understand.
V. DANGEROUS DISTRACTIONS CONCERNING NEUROSCIENCE AND
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
This part considers a number of related issues that are often thought to
be relevant to criminal responsibility and competence but that are in fact
irrelevant, confusing, and distracting: free will, causation as an excuse,
causation as compulsion, prediction as an excuse, dualism, and the nonefficacy of mental states, many of which have already been touched upon.
It is important to correct these errors because much of the unjustified legal
exuberance about the contributions of neuroscience to criminal law flows
from them. The legal exuberance also flows, however, from unrealistic
expectations about the scientific accomplishments of neuroscience. A later
part of this Article addresses the scientific exuberance.
Contrary to what many people believe, and what judges and others
sometimes say, free will is not a legal criterion that is part of any doctrine,
and it is not even foundational for criminal responsibility.36 As Part III
noted when adopting a compatibilist metaphysics about responsibility,
criminal law doctrines are fully consistent with the truth of determinism or
universal causation that allegedly undermines the foundations of
responsibility. Even if determinism is true, some people act and some
34. I recognize that the common law and most state codes do not permit a duress excuse
when innocent life is taken. In contrast, section 2.09 of the Model Penal Code would permit
the excuse in appropriate cases, and this example makes the point most clearly without
confusing duress/necessity as a justification and duress as an excuse.
35. Stephen J. Morse, Uncontrollable Urges and Irrational People, 88 VA. L. REV. 1025,
1035 (2002); see Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 423–24 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
36. Stephen J. Morse, The Non-Problem of Free Will in Forensic Psychiatry and
Psychology, 25 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 203, 207 (2007).
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people do not. Some people form prohibited mental states, and some do
not. Some people are legally insane or act under duress when they commit
crimes, but most defendants are not legally insane or acting under duress.
Moreover, these distinctions matter to moral and legal theories of
responsibility and fairness that we have reason to endorse. Criminal law
addresses problems genuinely related to responsibility, including
consciousness, the formation of mental states such as intention and
knowledge, the capacity for rationality, and compulsion. The law, however,
never addresses the presence or absence of free will.
When most people use the term “free will” in the context of legal
responsibility, they are typically using it loosely as a synonym for the
conclusion that the defendant was or was not criminally responsible. They
typically have reached this conclusion for reasons that do not involve free
will understood as contra-causal freedom—for example, that the defendant
was legally insane or acted under duress—but such use of the term, “free
will,” only perpetuates misunderstanding and confusion. Once the legal
criteria for excuse have been met—and no excuse includes lack of free will
as a criterion—the defendant will be excused without any reference
whatsoever to free will as an independent ground for excuse.
There is a genuine metaphysical problem regarding free will, which is
whether human beings have the capacity to act uncaused by anything other
than themselves and whether this capacity is a necessary foundation for
holding anyone legally or morally accountable for criminal conduct.
Philosophers and others have debated these issues in various forms for
millennia, and there is no resolution in sight. Indeed, some people might
think that the problem is insoluble. This is a philosophical issue, but it is not
a problem for the law, and neuroscience raises no new challenge to this
conclusion. Solving the free will problem would have profound
implications for responsibility doctrines and practices, such as blame and
punishment, but having or lacking libertarian freedom is not a criterion of
any civil or criminal law doctrine.
Neuroscience is simply the most recent, mechanistic causal science that
appears deterministically to explain behavior. Neuroscience thus joins
social structural variables, behaviorism, genetics, and other scientific
explanations that have also been deterministic explanations for behavior.
In principle, however, neuroscience adds nothing new, even if neuroscience
is a better, more persuasive science than some of its predecessors. No
science, including neuroscience, can demonstrate that libertarian free will
does or does not exist. As long as free will in the strong sense is not
foundational for just blame and punishment and is not a criterion at the
doctrinal level, the truth of determinism or universal causation poses no
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threat to legal responsibility. Neuroscience may help shed light on folkpsychological excusing conditions, such as automatism or legal insanity, but
the truth of determinism is not an excusing condition. The law will be
fundamentally challenged only if neuroscience, or any other science, can
conclusively demonstrate that the law’s psychology is wrong and that we
are not the type of creatures for whom mental states are causally effective.
This is a different question from whether determinism undermines
responsibility, however, and this Article returns to it below.
A related confusion is that behavior is excused if it is caused, but
causation per se is not a legal or moral mitigating or excusing condition. I
termed this confusion the “fundamental psycholegal error.”37 At most,
causal explanations can only provide evidence concerning whether a
genuine excusing condition, such as lack of rational capacity, was present.
Brain causation—or any other kind of causation—does not mean that we
are automatons, not really acting agents at all, or otherwise excused. Even
a genuinely abnormal cause is not per se an excusing condition. For
example, imagine an armed robber who suffers from intermittent
hypomania and who only robs when he is clinically hypomanic because
only then does he feel sufficiently energetic and confident. In other words,
the hypomania is a “but for” cause of his robberies. Nevertheless, he would
not be excused for an armed robbery because hypomania seldom
compromises rational capacity sufficiently to warrant an excuse. If he
committed an armed robbery under the influence of a delusional belief his
mania produced, then he might be excused by reason of legal insanity. In
that case, the excusing condition would be compromised rationality and not
the mania per se. In short, a neuroscientific causal explanation for criminal
conduct, like any other type of causal explanation, does not per se mitigate
or excuse. It only provides evidence that might help the law resolve
whether a genuine excuse existed, or it may in the future provide data that
might be a guide to prophylactic or rehabilitative measures.
All behavior is the product of the necessary and sufficient causal
conditions without which the behavior would not have occurred, including
brain causation, which is always part of the causal explanation for any
behavior. If causation were an excusing condition per se, then no one would
be responsible for any behavior. Some people might welcome such a
conclusion and believe that responsibility is impossible, but this is not the
legal and moral world we inhabit. The law holds most adults responsible
for most of their conduct, and genuine excusing conditions are limited.
Unless the person’s history or mental condition, for example, provides
37. Stephen J. Morse, Culpability and Control, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1587, 1592–94 (1994).
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evidence of an existing excusing or mitigating condition, such as lack of
rational capacity, there is no reason for excuse or mitigation.
Compulsion is a genuine mitigating or excusing condition, but
causation—including brain causation—is not the equivalent of compulsion.
Part IV showed that compulsion may be either literal or metaphorical and
normative. It is crucial to recognize that most human action is not plausibly
the result of either type of compulsion, but all human behavior is caused by
its necessary and sufficient causes—including brain causation. Even
abnormal causes are not necessarily compelling. To illustrate, suppose that
a person has weak pedophilic urges and weak sexual urges in general. If
this person molested a child, there would be no ground for a compulsion
excuse. If causation were the equivalent of compulsion, all behavior would
be compelled and no one would be responsible. Once again, this is not a
plausible account of the law’s responsibility conditions. Causal information
from neuroscience might help us resolve questions concerning whether
legal compulsion existed, or it might be a guide to prophylactic or
rehabilitative measures when dealing with plausible legal compulsion.
Causation, however, is not per se compulsion.
Causal knowledge, whether from neuroscience or any other science, can
enhance the accuracy of behavioral predictions, but predictability is also not
a per se excusing or mitigating condition, even if the predictability of the
behavior is perfect. To understand this, consider how many things we do
that are perfectly predictable but for which there is no plausible excusing
or mitigating condition. If the variables that enhance prediction also
produce a genuine excusing or mitigating condition, then excuse or
mitigation is justified for the latter reason and independent of the
prediction.
For example, recent research demonstrates that a history of childhood
abuse coupled with a specific, genetically produced enzyme abnormality
that produces a neurotransmitter deficit increases the risk that a person will
behave antisocially as an adolescent or young adult.38 Does this mean that
an offender with this gene by environment interaction is not responsible or
less responsible? No. The offender may not be fully responsible or
responsible at all but not because there is a causal explanation. What is the
intermediary excusing or mitigating principle? Are these people, for
instance, more impulsive? Are they lacking rationality? What is the actual
excusing or mitigating condition?
Most informed people are not “dualists” concerning the relation
38. See, e.g., Avshalom Caspi et al., Role of Genotype in the Cycle of Violence in
Maltreated Children, 297 SCIENCE 851 (2002). Indeed, the risk is nine times higher.
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between the mind and the brain. That is, they no longer think that our
minds (or “souls”) are independent of our brains and bodies more generally
and can somehow exert a causal influence over our bodies. It may seem as
if the law’s emphasis on the importance of mental states as causing behavior
is based on a prescientific, outmoded form of dualism, but this is not the
case. Although the brain enables the mind, we have no idea how this occurs
and have no idea how action is possible.39 It is clear that, at the least, mental
states are dependent upon or supervene on brain states, but neither
neuroscience nor any other science has demonstrated that mental states do
not play an independent and partial causal role.
Despite our lack of understanding of the mind-brain-action relation, the
Introduction to this Article showed that some scientists question whether
mental states have any causal effect, thus treating mental states as psychic
appendixes that evolution has created but that have no genuine function.
These claims are not strawpersons. They are made by serious, thoughtful
people.40 As discussed in Part VIII below, if accepted, they would create a
complete and revolutionary paradigm shift in the law of criminal
responsibility and more widely.
In conclusion, legal actors concerned with criminal law policy, doctrine,
and adjudication must always keep the folk-psychological view present in
their minds when considering claims or evidence from neuroscience and
must always question how the science is legally relevant to the law’s action
and mental-states criteria. The truth of determinism, causation, and
predictability do not in themselves answer any doctrinal or policy issue.
VI. LOST IN TRANSLATION? LEGAL RELEVANCE AND THE NEED FOR
TRANSLATION
What in principle is the possible relation of neuroscience to the
criminal law’s responsibility doctrines canvassed in Part IV? We must
begin with a distinction between internal relevance and external
relevance. An internal contribution or critique accepts the general
coherence and legitimacy of a set of legal doctrines, practices, or
institutions and attempts to explain or alter them. For example, an
internal contribution to criminal responsibility may suggest the need for
doctrinal reform of, say, the insanity defense, but it would not suggest that
the notion of criminal responsibility is itself incoherent or illegitimate. By
contrast, an externally relevant critique suggests that the doctrines,
practices, or institutions are incoherent, illegitimate, or unjustified.
39. See MCHUGH & SLAVNEY, supra note 18, at 11–12; Adolphs, supra note 18, at 175.
40. See, e.g., Greene & Cohen, supra note 3, at 219.
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Because a radical, external critique has little possibility of success at
present (as is explained below), I make the simplifying assumption that
the contributions of neuroscience will be internal and thus will need to be
translated into the law’s folk-psychological concepts.
The law’s criteria for responsibility and competence are essentially
behavioral—acts and mental states. The criteria of neuroscience are
mechanistic—neural structure and function. Is the apparent chasm
between those two types of discourse bridgeable? This is a familiar
question in the field of law and mental health,41 but there is even greater
dissonance in law and neuroscience. Psychiatry and psychology sometimes
treat behavior mechanistically, sometimes treat it folk psychologically, and
sometimes blend the two. Consider depression, which may be understood
both biologically and psychologically. Even the most biologically oriented
psychiatrist treating a depressed patient with antidepressant medication
will also inquire about the course of the patient’s life (if the psychiatrist is
competent). In many cases, the psychological sciences are quite close to
folk psychology in approach. Neuroscience, in contrast, is purely
mechanistic and eschews folk-psychological concepts and discourse.
Neurons, neural networks, and the connectome do not act intentionally for
reasons. They have no sense of past, present, or future and no aspirations.
They do not recognize that they will die. Thus, the gap will be harder to
bridge for neuroscience than for psychiatry and psychology.
The brain does enable the mind (even if we do not know how this
occurs). Therefore, facts we learn about brains in general, or about a
specific brain, could in principle provide useful information about mental
states and about human capacities in general and in specific cases. Some
believe that this conclusion is a category error.42 This is a plausible view,
and perhaps it is correct. If it is, then the whole subject of the relation of
neuroscience to law is mostly empty. Let us, therefore, bracket this
pessimistic view and determine what follows from the more optimistic
position that what we learn about the brain and nervous system can be
potentially helpful to resolving questions of criminal responsibility if the
findings are properly translated into the law’s psychological framework.
The question is whether the new neuroscience is legally relevant
because it makes a proposition about responsibility more or less likely to
be true. Any legal criterion must be established independently, and

41. See, e.g., ALAN A. STONE, LAW, PSYCHIATRY, AND MORALITY 95–96 (1984).
42. See, e.g., MAX R. BENNETT & P.M.S. HACKER, PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
NEUROSCIENCE 112, 270, 360, 381 (2003). PARDO & PATTERSON, supra note 7, at 135, also
share much of this caution.
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biological evidence must be translated into the criminal law’s folkpsychological behavioral criteria. That is, the expert must be able to explain
precisely how the neuroevidence bears on whether the agent acted, formed
the required mens rea, or met the criteria for an excusing condition. If the
evidence is not directly relevant, the expert should be able to explain the
chain of inference from the indirect evidence to the law’s criteria. No handwaving should be permitted by allowing the expert or scholar to move
directly from indirect evidence to a legal conclusion. The chain of reasoning
should be clear and plausible. At present, as I explain in the next part, few
such data exist, but neuroscience is advancing so rapidly that such data may
exist in the near or medium term. Moreover, the argument is conceptual
and does not depend on any particular neuroscience findings.
The problem of translation is going to be fearsomely hard. As the next
part indicates, present neuroscience is not likely to help us with the
marginal legal cases, even if the translation problem is solved in an
individual case. For the most part, we will have to rely on careful behavioral
investigation and plenty of common sense.
VII.THE PRESENT LIMITS OF NEUROSCIENCE AND ITS LEGAL
IMPLICATIONS
Most generally, the relation of brain, mind, and action is one of the
hardest problems in all science. Once again, we have no idea how the brain
enables the mind or how action is possible.43 The brain-mind-action
relation is a mystery not because it is inherently not subject to scientific
explanation, but because the problem is so hard. For example, we would
like to know the difference between a neuromuscular spasm and
intentionally moving one’s arm in exactly the same way. The former is a
purely mechanical motion, whereas the latter is an action, but we cannot
explain the difference between the two. The philosopher, Ludwig
Wittgenstein, famously asked: “Let us not forget this: when ‘I raise my arm’,
my arm goes up. And the problem arises: what is left over if I subtract the
fact that my arm goes up from the fact that I raise my arm?”44 We know
that a functioning brain is a necessary condition for having mental states
and for acting. After all, if your brain is dead, you have no mental states
and are not acting. Still, we do not know how mental states and action are
caused.

43. See MCHUGH & SLAVNEY, supra note 18, at 11–12; Adolphs, supra note 18, at 175.
44. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS ¶ 621 (G.E.M.
Anscombe trans., 1953) (1953).
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Despite the astonishing advances in neuroimaging and other
neuroscientific methods, we still do not have sophisticated causal
knowledge of how the brain works generally, and we have little information
that is legally relevant. The scientific problems are fearsomely difficult.
Only in the present century have researchers begun to accumulate much
data from fMRI imaging, which is the technology that has generated most
of the legal interest. New artifacts are constantly being discovered.45
Moreover, virtually no studies have been performed to address specifically
legal questions. The criminal justice system should not expect too much of
a young science that uses new technologies to investigate some of the most
dreadfully difficult problems in science and that does not directly address
questions of legal interest.
Before turning to the specific reasons for neuromodesty, a few
preliminary points of general applicability must be addressed. The first and
most important is contained in the message of Part V. Causation by
biological variables, including abnormal biological variables, does not per
se create an excusing or mitigating condition. Any excusing condition must
be established independently. The goal is always to translate the biological
evidence into the criminal law’s folk-psychological criteria. Assessing
criminal responsibility involves a retrospective evaluation of the
defendant’s mental states at the time of the crime. No criminal wears a
portable scanner or other neurodetection device that provides a
measurement at the time of the crime, at least not yet. Further,
neuroscience is insufficiently developed to detect specific, legally relevant
mental content or to provide a sufficiently accurate diagnostic marker for
even a severe mental disorder.46 Nonetheless, certain aspects of neural
structure and function that bear on legally relevant capacities, such as the
capacity for rationality and control, may be temporally stable in general or
in individual cases. If they are, neuroevidence may permit a reasonably
45. E.g., Craig M. Bennett et al., The Principled Control of False Positives in
Neuroimaging, 4 SOC. COGNITIVE & AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE 417 (2009) (indicating that
a high percentage of previous fMRI studies did not properly control for false positives by
controlling for what is called “multiple comparisons”). This problem was termed by one group
of authors “voodoo correlations,” but they toned back the claim to more scientifically
respectable language. Edward Vul et al., Puzzlingly High Correlations in fMRI Studies of
Emotion, Personality, and Social Cognition, 4 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 274 (2009). Needless
to say, there was pushback against such criticisms. See, e.g., Matthew D. Lieberman et al.,
Correlations in Social Neuroscience Aren’t Voodoo: A Commentary on Vul et al. (2009), 4
PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 299 (2009). As any old country lawyer knows, when a stone is thrown
into a pack of dogs, the one that gets hit yelps.
46. Stephen J. Morse & William T. Newsome, Criminal Responsibility, Criminal
Competence, and Prediction of Criminal Behavior, in A PRIMER ON CRIMINAL LAW AND
NEUROSCIENCE 150, 159–60, 167 (Stephen J. Morse & Adina L. Roskies eds., 2013).
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valid retrospective inference about the defendant’s rational and control
capacities and their impact on criminal behavior. This will, of course,
depend on the existence of adequate science to do this. We currently lack
such science,47 but future research may provide the necessary data.48
Now let us consider the specific grounds for neuromodesty in cognitive,
affective, and social neuroscience, the sub-disciplines most relevant to law.
At present, most neuroscience studies on human beings involve very small
numbers of subjects, although this phenomenon is rapidly starting to
change as the cost of scanning decreases. Future studies will have more
statistical power. Most of the studies have been done on college and
university students, who are hardly a random sample of the population
generally and of criminal offenders specifically. There is also a serious
question of whether findings based on subjects’ behavior and brain activity
in a scanner would apply to real-world situations. This is known as the
problem of “ecological validity.” Does a subject’s performance in a
laboratory on an executive function task in a scanner really predict the
person’s ability to resist criminal offending?49
Most studies average the neurodata over the subjects, and the average
finding may not accurately describe the brain structure or function of any
actual subject in the study. Replications are few, which is especially
important for law. Policy and adjudication should not be influenced by
findings that are insufficiently established, and replications of findings are

47. Id. at 166–67 (explaining generally that, except in the cases of a few well-characterized
medical disorders such as epilepsy, current neuroscience has little to add to resolving questions
of criminal responsibility).
48. In contrast, questions concerning various criminal competencies, such as competence to
stand trial or to plead guilty, and predictions of future behavior are based on a subject’s present
condition. Thus, the problems besetting retrospective responsibility analysis do not apply to such
issues. The criteria for competence are functional. They ask whether the subject can perform
some task—such as understanding the nature of a criminal proceeding or understanding a
treatment option that is offered—at a level the law considers normatively acceptable to warrant
respecting the subject’s choice and autonomy. Prediction questions simply ask about the
probability of some particular future behavior’s occurring within some time frame, but the law’s
criteria for predictions are typically framed as standards and thus allow room for normative
judgment.
49. For example, the famous Stroop test asks subjects to state the color in which a color
word is written, rather than simply to read the word itself. Thus, if the word “red” is written in
yellow, the correct answer is yellow. We all have what is known as a strong prepotent response
(a strong behavioral disposition) simply to read the word rather than to identify the color in
which it is written. It takes a lot of inhibitory ability to refrain from the prepotent response.
But are people who do poorly on the Stroop more predisposed to commit violent crimes even
if the associated brain activation is consistent with decreased prefrontal control in subjects?
We do not know. And in any case, what legally relevant, extra information does the
neuroscience add to the behavioral data with which it was correlated?
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crucial to our confidence in a result, especially given the problem of
publication bias. Finally, the neuroscience of cognition and interpersonal
behavior is largely in its infancy and what is known is quite coarse-grained
and correlational, rather than fine-grained and causal.50 What is being
investigated is an association between a condition or a task in the scanner
and brain activity. These studies do not demonstrate that the brain activity
is a sensitive diagnostic marker for the condition or either a necessary,
sufficient, or predisposing causal condition for the behavioral task that is
being done in the scanner. Any language that suggests otherwise—such as
claiming that some brain region is the neural substrate for the behavior—is
simply not justifiable based on the methodology of most studies. Such
inferences are only justified if everything else in the brain remained
constant, which is seldom the case.51 Moreover, activity in the same region
may be associated with diametrically opposite behavioral phenomena—for
example, love and hate.
There are also technical and research design difficulties. It takes many
mathematical transformations to get from the raw fMRI data to the images
of the brain that are increasingly familiar. Explaining these transformations
is beyond me, but I do understand that the likelihood that an investigator
will find a statistically significant result depends on how the researcher sets
the threshold for significance. There is dispute about this, and the threshold
levels are conventional. If the threshold changes, so does the outcome. I
have been convinced by neuroscience colleagues that many such technical
difficulties have largely been solved, but research design and potentially
unjustified inferences from the studies are still an acute problem. It is
extraordinarily difficult to control for all conceivable artifacts.
Consequently, there are often problems of over-inference.
Neuroscience also shares with other sciences what is known as the G2i
problem, which is how to make inferences about a particular individual
based on group data.52 Scientists are interested in how the world works
and produce general information. Law is often concerned with individual
cases, and it is difficult to know how properly to apply relevant group
data. For example, as noted, a neuroscience study that reports increased
activation in some brain region of interest bases its conclusion on
averaging the activation across all the subjects, but no subject’s brain may
50. See, e.g., Gregory A. Miller, Mistreating Psychology in the Decades of the Brain, 5
PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 716 (2010) (providing a cautious, thorough overview of the scientific
and practical problems facing cognitive and social neuroscience).
51. Adolphs, supra note 18, at 173.
52. See generally David L. Faigman, John Monahan & Christopher Slobogin, Group to
Individual (G2i) Inference in Scientific Expert Testimony, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 417 (2014).
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have activated precisely in the area identified. If such group data are
permitted, as they now are for functions such as predictions, the question
is how to use probabilistic data to answer what is often a binary question.53
This is a topic under intensive investigation at present, and I assume
progress will be made.
Over time, all these problems identified may ease as imaging and other
techniques become less expensive and more accurate, research designs
become more sophisticated, and the sophistication of the science increases
generally.
How should the law respond when valid and relevant neuroevidence is
inconsistent with the defendant’s behavior? Recall that the criminal law’s
criteria are all behavioral—actions and mental states. Therefore, cases of
malingering aside, actions speak louder than images. This is a truism for all
criminal responsibility. If the finding of any test or measurement of
behavior is contradicted by actual behavioral evidence, then we must
believe the real world behavioral evidence because it is more direct and
probative of the law’s behavioral criteria. For example, if the person
behaves rationally in a wide variety of circumstances, the agent is rational
even if the brain appears structurally or functionally abnormal. We
confidently knew that some people were behaviorally abnormal, such as
being psychotic (grossly out of touch with reality), long before there were
any psychological or neurological tests for such abnormalities.
An analogy from physical medicine may be instructive. Suppose
someone complains about back pain, a subjective symptom, and the
question is whether the subject actually does have back pain. We know that
many people with abnormal spines do not experience back pain, and many
people who complain of back pain have normal spines. If the person is
claiming a disability and the spine looks dreadful, evidence that the person
regularly exercises on a trampoline without difficulty indicates that there is
no disability caused by back pain. If there is reason to suspect malingering,
however, and there is not clear behavioral evidence of lack of pain, then a
completely normal spine might be of use in deciding whether the claimant
53. For an interesting current example of this problem in the context of the capital
punishment proceeding for Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, the defendant convicted of the Boston
Marathon bombings, see Sally Satel & Scott O. Lilienfeld, The “Immature Teen Brain” Defense
POST
(May
7,
2015),
and
the
Dzhokhar
Tsarnaev
Trial,
WASH.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/05/07/the-immature-teenbrain-defense-and-the-dzhokhar-tsarnaev-trial/ [http://perma.cc/8F6J-W5K5], and Sally Satel
& Scott O. Lilienfeld, Neuro-expert testifies for Tsarnaev, WASH. POST (May 11, 2015),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/05/11/neuro-experttestifies-for-tsarnaev/ [http://perma.cc/VB4D-PVBP]. In the event, the jury was not swayed by
the general neuroscientific data about the juvenile brain and sentenced Tsarnaev to death.
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is malingering. Unless the correlation between the image and the legally
relevant behavior is very powerful, however, such evidence will be of
limited help. Further, although the neuroscience of pain is making
advances,54 neuroscience cannot be used at present to diagnose mental
disorder because scanning is insufficiently sensitive for these purposes.55
If the behavioral data are not clear, then the potential contribution of
neuroscience is large. Unfortunately, it is in just such cases that
neuroscience at present is not likely to be of much help. I term the reason
for this the “clear cut” problem.56 Virtually all neuroscience studies of
potential interest to the law involve some behavior that has already been
identified as of interest, and the point of the study is to identify that
behavior’s neural correlates. Neuroscientists do not go on general “fishing”
expeditions.57 There is usually some bit of behavior—such as addiction,
schizophrenia or impulsivity—that investigators would like to understand
better by investigating its neural correlates. To do this properly
presupposes that the researchers have already well-characterized and
validated the behavior under neuroscientific investigation. Thus, neurodata
can be no more valid than the behavior with which it is correlated. In such
cases, the neural markers might be quite sensitive to the already clearly
identified behaviors precisely because the behavior is so clear. Less clear
behavior is simply not studied, or the overlap in data about less clear
behavior is greater between experimental and comparison subjects. Thus,
the neural markers of clear cases will provide little guidance to resolve
behaviorally ambiguous cases of legally relevant behavior, and they are
unnecessary if the behavior is sufficiently clear.
On occasion, the neuroscience might suggest that the behavior is not
54. Amanda C. Pustilnik, Imaging Brains, Changing Minds: How Pain Neuroimaging Can
Help Transform the Law, 66 ALA. L. REV. 1099 (forthcoming 2015).
55. Allen Frances, Whither DSM-V?, 195 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 391 (2009). Many studies
do find differences between patients with mental disorders and controls, but the differences are
too small to be used diagnostically. See generally John P.A. Ioannidis, Excess Significance Bias
in the Literature on Brain Volume Abnormalities, 68 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 773 (2011)
(claiming, based on a meta-analysis of studies of brain volume abnormalities in patients with
mental disorders, that many more studies than should be expected found statistically significant
results and that this can be best explained by bias in the reporting of the data).
56. Morse, supra note 6, at 540.
57. For an amusing exception, see Craig M. Bennett et al., Neural Correlates of
Interspecies Perspective Taking in the Post-Mortem Atlantic Salmon: An Argument for Proper
Multiple Comparisons Correction, 1 J. SERENDIPITOUS & UNEXPECTED RESULTS 1 (2009),
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.161.8384&rep=rep1&type=pdf [http
://perma.cc/VU7B-K5DJ]. The study scanned a dead Atlantic salmon to demonstrate that
significant results can be obtained from the most unpromising investigation unless the research
design properly controls for chance findings (false positives).
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well-characterized or is neurally indistinguishable from other, seemingly
different behavior. In general, however, the existence of legally relevant
behavior will already be apparent before the neuroscientific investigation
is begun. For example, some people are grossly out of touch with reality. If,
as a result, they do not understand right from wrong, we excuse them
because they lack such knowledge. We might learn a great deal about the
neural correlates of such psychological abnormalities. But we already knew
without neuroscientic data that these abnormalities existed, and we had a
firm view of their normative significance. In the future, however, we may
learn more about the causal link between the brain and behavior, and
studies may be devised that are more directly legally relevant. I suspect
that we are unlikely to make substantial progress with neural assessment of
legally relevant mental content, but we are likely to learn more about
capacities that will bear on excuse or mitigation.
If actions speak louder than images and the clear cut problem exists,
however, what room is there for introducing neuroevidence in legal cases?
Let us begin with cases in which the behavioral evidence is clear and
permits an equally clear inference about the defendant’s mental state. For
example, lay people may not know the technical term to apply to people
who are manifestly out of touch with reality, but they will readily recognize
this unfortunate condition. No further tests of any sort will be necessary to
prove that the subject suffers from seriously impaired rationality. In such
cases, neuroevidence will be at most convergent and increase our
confidence in what we already had confidently concluded. Determining if
it is worth collecting the neuroevidence will depend on whether the costbenefit analysis justifies obtaining convergent evidence.
Roper v. Simmons is the most striking example of a case in which the
behavioral evidence was clear.58 In Roper, the United States Supreme
Court categorically excluded the death penalty for capital murderers who
killed when they were sixteen or seventeen years old on the grounds that
adolescents do not deserve the death penalty.59 The amicus briefs were
replete with neuroscience data showing that the brains of late adolescents
are not fully, biologically mature, and advocates used these data to suggest
that adolescent killers could not be fairly put to death.60 Now, we already
knew from commonsense observation and from rigorous behavioral studies
that juveniles are on average less rational than adults. What could the
58. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
59. Id. at 578–79.
60. E.g., Brief of the American Medical Association et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633).
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neuroscientific evidence about the juvenile brain have added? It was
consistent with the undeniable behavioral data and perhaps provided a
partial causal explanation of the behavioral differences. The proffered
neuroscience data were therefore merely additive and only indirectly
relevant, and the Supreme Court did not cite these data, except perhaps by
implication when it referred vaguely to “other” scientific evidence.61
Whether adolescents are sufficiently less rational on average than
adults, to exclude them categorically from the death penalty is a normative
legal question and not a scientific or psychological question. Advocates
claimed, however, that the neuroscience confirmed that adolescents are
insufficiently responsible to be executed, thus confusing the positive and
the normative. The neuroscience evidence in no way independently
confirms that adolescents are less responsible. If the behavioral differences
between adolescents and adults were slight, it would not matter if their
brains were quite different. Similarly, if the behavioral differences were
sufficient for moral and constitutional differential treatment, then it would
not matter if the brains were essentially indistinguishable. If the brains
were indistinguishable, the most sensible inference would be that
neuroscience is not yet sensitive enough to track the behavioral differences,
not that we are mistaken about whether behavioral differences exist.
For another example, suppose that in an insanity defense case the
question is whether the defendant suffers from a major mental disorder
such as schizophrenia. In extreme cases, the behavior will be clear, and no
neurodata will be necessary. Investigators have discovered various small,
but statistically significant, differences in neural structure or function
between people who are clearly suffering from schizophrenia and those
who are not.62 Nonetheless in a behaviorally unclear case, the overlap
61. Id. at 569, 573. The Supreme Court referred generally to other science, but it was not
clear whether neuroscience played a specific role. The Supreme Court did cite neuroscientific
findings in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 77–82 (2010), which categorically excluded juveniles
from life without the possibility of parole in non-homicide cases, and in Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.
Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012), which held that the sentence of life without possibility of parole was
constitutional for juveniles who committed homicide crimes but that it was unconstitutional to
impose this penalty mandatorily. In both cases, the citation was conclusory and generally nonspecific, and I believe it was dictum. The Supreme Court was responding in Graham to an
argument that no party had seriously made, which was that the science of adolescent development
had changed significantly since Roper was decided. Also in Miller, the Court drew a distinction
between social science and “science.” Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464 n.5. Social science, like
neuroscience, is science (and arguably more directly relevant to legal criteria for the reasons this
Article has discussed). The important distinctions are between good and bad science and legally
relevant and legally irrelevant science.
62. On the other hand, there may be reason to be cautious about such findings. See
generally Ioannidis, supra note 55.
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between data on the brains of people with schizophrenia and people
without the disorder is so great that a scan is insufficiently sensitive to be
used for diagnostic purposes. In short, at present in those cases in which
the neuroscience would be most helpful, it has little to contribute. Again,
this situation may change if neural markers become more diagnostically
sensitive for legally relevant criteria.
Some people think that executive capacity—the congeries of cognitive
and emotional capacities that help to plan and regulate human behavior—
is going to be the Holy Grail to help the law determine an offender’s true
culpability. After all, there is an attractive moral case that people with a
substantial lack of these capacities are less culpable, even if their conduct
satisfied the prima facie case for the crime charged. Perhaps neuroscience
can provide specific data previously unavailable to identify executive
capacity differences more precisely.
There are two problems, however. First, significant problems with
executive capacity are readily apparent without testing, and criminal law
simply will not adopt fine-grained culpability criteria. Second, the
correlation between neuropsychological tests of executive capacity and
actual real world behavior is not terribly strong.63 Only a small fraction of
the variance is accounted for, and the scanning studies will use the types of
tasks the psychological tests use. Consequently, we are far from able to use
neuroscience accurately to assess non-obvious executive-capacity
differences that are valid in real world contexts.
VIII.THE RADICAL NEUROCHALLENGE: ARE WE VICTIMS OF
NEURONAL CIRCUMSTANCES?
This part addresses the claim and hope raised earlier that neuroscience
will cause a paradigm shift in criminal responsibility by demonstrating that
we are “merely victims of neuronal circumstances” (or some similar claim
that denies human agency). This claim holds that we are not the kinds of
intentional creatures we think we are. If our mental states play no role in
our behavior and are simply epiphenomenal, then traditional notions of
responsibility based on mental states and on actions guided by mental
states would be imperiled. But is the rich explanatory apparatus of
intentionality simply a post hoc rationalization that the brains of hapless
homo sapiens construct to explain what their brains have already done?
Will the criminal justice system as we know it wither away as an outmoded
63. See, e.g., Russell A. Barkley & Kevin R. Murphy, Impairment in Occupational
Functioning and Adult ADHD: The Predictive Utility of Executive Function (EF) Ratings
Versus EF Tests, 25 ARCHIVES CLINICAL NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 157 (2010).
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relic of a prescientific and cruel age? If so, criminal law is not the only area
of law in peril. What will be the fate of contracts, for example, when a
biological machine that was formerly called a person claims that it should
not be bound because it did not make a contract? The contract is also
simply the outcome of various “neuronal circumstances.”
Before continuing, we must understand that the compatibilist
metaphysics adopted in Part III does not save agency if the radical claim is
true. If determinism is true, two states of the world concerning agency are
possible: agency exists or it does not. Compatibilism assumes that agency
is true because it holds that agents can be responsible in a determinist
universe. It thus essentially begs the question against the radical claim. If
the radical claim is true, then compatibilism is false because no
responsibility is possible if we are not agents. It is an incoherent notion to
have genuine responsibility without agency. The question is whether the
radical claim is true.
Given how little we know about the brain-mind and brain-mind-action
connections, to claim that we should radically change our conceptions of
ourselves and our legal doctrines and practices based on neuroscience is a
form of “neuroarrogance.” Although I predict that we will see far more
numerous attempts to introduce neuroevidence in the future, I have
elsewhere argued that for conceptual and scientific reasons, there is no
reason at present to believe that we are not agents.64 In particular, I can
report that the “Libet industry” that overclaimed about the alleged moral
and legal implications of neuroscientist Benjamin Libet’s findings appears
to be bankrupt. His work found that there was brain activity in the
supplemental motor area prior to awareness of the urge to bodily
movements and before movements occurred. This work and the findings
of other similar investigations led to the assertion that our brains do all
the causal work in explaining behavior. Recent conceptual and empirical
work seems to have exploded these claims.65 In short, I doubt that this
64. Morse, supra note 6, at 543–54; Stephen J. Morse, Determinism and the Death of Folk
Psychology: Two Challenges to Responsibility from Neuroscience, 9 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 1
(2008).
65. See, e.g., ALFRED R. MELE, EFFECTIVE INTENTIONS: THE POWER OF CONSCIOUS
WILL (2009); ALFRED R. MELE, FREE: WHY SCIENCE HASN’T DISPROVED FREE WILL
(2014); Moore, supra note 7; Parashkev Nachev & Peter Hacker, The Neural Antecedents to
Voluntary Action: Response to Commentaries, 6 COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 180 (2015);
Aaron Schurger et al., An Accumulator Model for Spontaneous Neural Activity Prior to SelfInitiated Movement, 109 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. E2904, (2012); Aaron Schurger & Sebo
Uithol, Nowhere and Everywhere: The Causal Origin of Voluntary Action, 2015 REV. PHIL.
PSYCH. (ONLINE FIRST ARTICLE) 1, http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13164-014-02232 [http://perma.cc/7DJL-5BWZ].
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industry will emerge from whatever chapter of the bankruptcy code
applies in such cases. It is possible that we are not agents, but the current
science does not remotely demonstrate that this is true. The burden of
persuasion is firmly on the proponents of the radical view.
Most important, the radical view entails no positive agenda. If the truth
of pure mechanism is a premise in deciding what to do, no particular moral,
legal, or political conclusions follow from it.66 The radical view provides no
guide as to how one should live or how one should respond to the truth of
reductive mechanism. Normativity depends on reason, and thus the radical
view is normatively inert. Reasons are mental states. If reasons do not
matter, then we have no reason to adopt any particular morals, politics, or
legal rules or to do anything at all.
Suppose we are convinced by the mechanistic view that we are not
intentional, rational agents after all.67 If it is really “true” that we do not
have mental states or, slightly more plausibly, that our mental states are
epiphenomenal and play no role in the causation of our actions, what
should we do now? If it is true, we know that it is an illusion to think that
our deliberations and intentions have any causal efficacy in the world. We
also know, however, that we experience sensations—such as pleasure and
pain—and care about what happens to us and to the world. We cannot just
sit quietly and wait for our brains to activate, for determinism to happen.
We must, and will, deliberate and act. And if we do not act in accord with
the “truth” that the radical view suggests, we cannot be blamed. Our brains
made us do it.
Even if we still thought that the radical view was correct and standard
notions of genuine moral responsibility and desert were therefore
impossible, we might still believe that the law would not necessarily have to
give up the concept of incentives. Indeed, Greene and Cohen concede that
we would have to keep punishing people for practical purposes.68 Such an
account would be consistent with “black box” accounts of economic
incentives that simply depend on the relation between inputs and outputs

66. This line of thought was first suggested by Professor Mitchell Berman in the context
of a discussion of determinism and normativity. Mitchell N. Berman, Punishment and
Justification, 118 ETHICS 258, 271 n.34 (2008).
67. Of course, the notion of being “convinced” would be an illusion, too. Being convinced
means that we are persuaded by evidence or argument, but a mechanism is not persuaded by
anything. A mechanism is simply neurophysically transformed.
68. Greene & Cohen, supra note 3, at 218. The use of the word “punish” is a solecism in
their account. Punishment in criminal justice has a constitutive moral meaning associated with
guilt and desert. It is not simply a negative reinforcement. They should more properly be
talking simply in terms of positive and negative reinforcements.
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without considering the mind as a mediator between the two. For those
who believe that a thoroughly naturalized account of human behavior
entails complete consequentialism, this conclusion might be welcomed.
On the other hand, this view seems to entail the same internal
contradiction just explored. What is the nature of the agent that is
discovering the laws governing how incentives shape behavior? Could
understanding and providing incentives via social norms and legal rules
simply be epiphenomenal interpretations of what the brain has already
done? How do we decide which behaviors to reinforce positively or
negatively? What role does reason—a property of thoughts and agents, not
a property of brains—play in this decision?
Given what we know and have reason to do, the allegedly disappearing
person remains fully visible and necessarily continues to act for good
reasons, including the reasons currently to reject the radical view. We are
not Pinocchios, and our brains are not Geppettos pulling the strings. And
this is a very good thing. Ultimately, I believe that the vision of the person,
of interpersonal relations, and of society the radical view entails bleaches
the soul. In the concrete and practical world we live in, we must be guided
by our values and a vision of the good life. I do not want to live in the
radical’s world that is stripped of genuine agency, desert, autonomy, and
dignity. For all its imperfections, the criminal law’s vision of the person
and agency is more respectful and humane.
IX. THE CASE FOR CAUTIOUS NEUROLAW OPTIMISM
Despite having claimed that we should be exceptionally cautious about
the current contributions that neuroscience can make to criminal law policy,
doctrine, and adjudication, I am modestly optimistic about the near and
intermediate term contributions neuroscience can potentially make to our
ordinary, traditional, folk-psychological criminal law doctrine and practice.
In other words, neuroscience may make a positive contribution even
though there has been no paradigm shift in thinking about the nature of the
person and the criteria for criminal responsibility. The legal regime to
which neuroscience will contribute will continue to take people seriously as
people—as autonomous agents who may fairly be blamed and punished
based on their mental states and actions.
In general, my hope is that over time there will be feedback between
the folk-psychological criteria and the neuroscientific data. Each might
inform the other. Conceptual work on mental states might suggest new
neuroscientific studies, for example, and the neuroscientific studies might
help refine the folk-psychological categories. The ultimate goal would be a
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reflective, conceptual–empirical equilibrium. At present, I think much of
the most promising legally relevant research concerns areas other than
criminal justice,69 but in what follows I will focus on criminal law.
More specifically, there are four types of situations in which
neuroscience may be of assistance: (1) data indicating that the folkpsychological assumption underlying a legal rule is incorrect; (2) data
suggesting the need for new or reformed legal doctrine; (3) evidence that
helps adjudicate an individual case; and (4) data that help efficient
adjudication or administration of criminal justice.
Many criminal law doctrines are based on folk-psychological
assumptions about behavior that may prove to be incorrect. If so, the
doctrine should change. For example, it is commonly assumed that agents
intend the natural and probable consequences of their actions. In many or
most cases it seems that they do, but neuroscience may help in the future to
demonstrate that this assumption is true far less frequently than we think
because, say, more apparent actions are automatic than is currently
realized.70 In that case, the rebuttable presumption used to help the
prosecution prove intent should be softened or used with more caution.
Second, neuroscientific data may suggest the need for new or reformed
legal doctrine. For example, control tests for legal insanity have been
disfavored for some decades because they are ill understood and hard to
assess. It is at present impossible to distinguish “cannot” from “will not,”
which is one of the reasons both the American Bar Association and the
American Psychiatric Association both recommended abolition of control
tests for legal insanity in the wake of the unpopular Hinckley verdict.71
Perhaps neuroscientific information will help to demonstrate and to prove
the existence of control difficulties that are independent of cognitive

69. E.g., objective identification of pain, which would transform tort and disability law.
See Pustilnik, supra note 54.
70. How successfully such research can be accomplished is difficult to predict, especially
if the folk wisdom concerns content rather than functions or capacities. In the example given,
a good working definition of automaticity would be necessary, and “experimental” subjects
being scanned would have to be reliably in an automatic state. This will be exceedingly difficult
research to do. Also, if the real world behavior and the neuroscience seem inconsistent, with
rare exception the behavior would have to be considered the accurate measure. Recall the
example from Part VII concerning adolescence. If neuroscience were not able to distinguish
average adolescent from average adult brains, the sensible conclusions based on common sense
and behavioral studies would be that adolescents on average behave less rationally and that the
neuroscience is not yet sufficiently advanced to permit identification of neural differences.
71. ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS 330, 339-42 (1989);
American Psychiatric Association Statement on the Insanity Defense, reprinted in 140 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 681 (1983).
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incapacities.72 If so, then independent control tests may be justified and can
be rationally assessed after all. More generally, perhaps a larger percentage
of offenders than we currently believe have such grave control difficulties
that they deserve a generic mitigation claim that is not available in criminal
law today.73 Neuroscience might help us discover that fact. If that were
true, justice would be served by adopting a generic mitigating doctrine. On
the other hand, if it turns out that such difficulties are not so common, we
could be more confident of the justice of current doctrine.
Third, neuroscience might provide data to help adjudicate individual
cases. Consider the insanity defense again. As in United States v. Hinckley,74
there is often dispute about whether a defendant claiming legal insanity
suffered from a mental disorder, which disorder the defendant suffered
from, or how severe the disorder was.75 At present, these questions must be
resolved entirely behaviorally, and there is often room for considerable
disagreement about inferences drawn from the defendant’s actions,
including utterances. In the future, neuroscience might help resolve such
questions if the clear-cut problem difficulty can be solved. In the
foreseeable future, I doubt that neuroscience will be able to help identify
the presence or absence of specific mens rea because mind reading seems
nearly impossible, but we may be able to identify brain states that suggest
that a subject is lying or is familiar with a place he denies recognizing.76
Finally, neuroscience might help us to implement current policy more
efficiently. For example, the criminal justice system makes predictions
72. See Michael S. Moore, The Neuroscience of Volitional Excuse, in LAW AND
NEUROSCIENCE: STATE OF THE ART (Dennis Patterson ed., forthcoming 2016). Moore makes
the most thorough attempt to date to provide both the folk-psychological mechanism for loss
of control and a neuroscientific agenda for studying it. I believe, however, that the mechanism
he describes is better understood as a cognitive rationality defect and that such defects are the
true source of alleged “loss of control” cases that might warrant mitigation or excuse. I address
this claim more fully in Stephen J. Morse, Moore on the Mind, in LEGAL, MORAL AND
METAPHYSICAL TRUTHS: THE PHILOSOPHY OF MICHAEL S. MOORE (Kimberly K. Ferzan &
Stephen J. Morse eds., forthcoming 2016).
73. I have proposed a generic mitigating condition that would address both cognitive and
control incapacities short of those warranting a full excuse. Stephen J. Morse, Diminished
Rationality, Diminished Responsibility, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 289 (2003).
74. 525 F. Supp. 1342 (D.D.C. 1981).
75. Id. at 1346.
76. Henry T. Greely, Mind Reading, Neuroscience, and the Law, in A PRIMER ON
CRIMINAL LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE, supra note 46, at 120. This is known as “brain reading”
because it identifies neural correlates of a mental process rather than the subject’s specific
mental content. The latter would be “mind reading.” For example, particular brain activation
might reliably indicate whether the subject was adding or subtracting, but it could not show
what specific numbers were being added or subtracted. John-Dylan Haynes et al., Reading
Hidden Intentions in the Human Brain, 17 CURRENT BIOLOGY 323 (2007).
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about future dangerous behavior for purposes of bail, sentencing (including
capital sentencing), and parole. If we have already decided that it is justified
to use dangerousness predictions to make such decisions, it is hard to
imagine a rational argument for doing it less accurately if we are in fact able
to do it more accurately.77 Behavioral prediction techniques already exist.
The question is whether neuroscientific variables can add value by
increasing the accuracy of such predictions considering the cost of
gathering such data. Very recently, two studies have been published
showing the potential usefulness of neural markers for enhancing the
accuracy of predictions of antisocial conduct.78 Although these must be
considered preliminary, “proof of concept” studies,79 it is perfectly plausible
that in the future genuinely valid, cost–benefit, justified neural markers will
be identified and, thus, prediction decisions will be more accurate and just.
X. CONCLUSION
At present, neuroscience has little to contribute to more just and
accurate criminal law policy, doctrine, and individual case adjudication.
This was the conclusion reached when I tentatively identified “Brain
Overclaim Syndrome” nine years ago, and it remains true today. In the
future, however, as the philosophies of mind and action and neuroscience
mutually mature and inform one another, neuroscience will help us
understand criminal behavior. Although no radical transformation of
criminal justice is likely to occur, neuroscience can inform criminal justice
as long as it is relevant to law and translated into the law’s folkpsychological framework and criteria. The home remedies are working,
and please don’t wake me until the doctor comes. As Jerry Fodor
counseled, “[E]verything is going to be all right.”80

77. 2 PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, GRAY
MATTERS: TOPICS AT THE INTERSECTION OF NEUROSCIENCE, ETHICS, AND SOCIETY 98
(2015) (approvingly quoting this position of mine).
78. Eyal Aharoni et al., Neuroprediction of Future Rearrest, 110 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI.
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